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Abstract
This paper analyzes a stylized (two period) credit market where investors care
about the appropriability of the information they produce when they engage
in costly ex ante evaluation of borrowers quality. We show that diversiﬁed in-
termediation arises as a dissimulation mechanism allowing investors to extract
informational rents in the second period, thereby mitigating the underlying ap-
propriability problem.
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I. Introduction
From a general perspective, the costly production of socially valuable information by
private agents is undermined by two pervasive problems (Hirshleifer and Riley 1979).
The reliability problem arises when an individual cannot credibly pass the information
to others, with the consequence that opportunities to sell the information are limited.
The appropriability problem arises on the contrary when the individual cannot pre-
vent others from using the information without buying it, leading to a standard free
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1riding phenomenon. In both situations, information production is limited because
the producer cannot extract the full value of information.
Intermediaries—and other institutions—may have been tailored as a response to
those and analogous informational frictions. Speciﬁcally, Ramakrishnan and Thakor
(1984) and Allen (1990), among others, have shown that ﬁnancial intermediaries can
mitigate the ﬁrst problem by lowering the cost of signaling information1. In contrast,
we develop in this paper a theory of ﬁnancial intermediation as a solution to the
second problem. The key idea is that intermediation raises the share of the value of
information that is appropriable, because it reduces the leakage of information from
the producer of that information to his competitors. The theory therefore provides an
explanation for the proprietary nature of the information banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions have about their clients.
More precisely, we analyze a credit market where lenders’ main concern is the
appropriability of the information they produce when initially engaging in the costly
evaluation of loan applicants. This hinges on two ingredients. (a) The present value
of information is distributed over two periods but the short term value does not cover
the initial cost. (b) The credit granting decision allows outside investors to infer
the quality of borrowers, thereby allowing them to poach ex post good borrowers
without having paid the initial cost. We show that diversiﬁcation within a ﬁnancial
intermediary can arise as a solution to this problem. The intuition runs as follows. By
simultaneously ﬁnancing more borrowers—some of which he is not able to evaluate—
the intermediary introduces ”noise” in his credit decision and can more easily conceal
information about the quality of an individual borrower. This gives more incentives
to engage in ex ante screening. Diversiﬁcation therefore acts as a way to protect the
informational rent thereby granting the future payments necessary to cover the initial
screening cost.
This work obviously relates to the huge literature on relationship banking initi-
ated by Mayer (1988). Our intermediary arises as a way to maintain the privacy of
information. In that sense, a contribution of the paper is to provide an explanation
for the proprietary aspect an intermediary’s information about borrowers. This pro-
prietary nature of banks’ information is one determinant of ﬁrms’ choice of ﬁnancing
sources as argued for instance by Yosha (1995) and Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995)2.
This may be contrasted to the idea formalized by Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Ra-
makrishnan and Thakor (1984) that intermediaries foster the revelation of hidden
information.
The paper is more closely related to the literature explaining diversiﬁcation within
intermediaries in a world of risk neutrality. In Diamond’s (1984) theory diversiﬁcation
of the bank portfolio reduces delegation costs because in the limit the intermediary’s
liabilities are certain and independent of the intermediary’s private information. In
our paper a larger portfolio diminishes the informational leakage about individual
borrowers. Cerasi and Daltung (2000) introduce diseconomies of scale in monitoring
and show that despite this some diversiﬁcation raises the bank’s incentives to mon-
itor. Like them, we have some notion of diseconomies of scale (in screening) as our
1These contributions follow a suggestion by Leland and Pyle (1977). See also Diamond (1984)
and Boyd and Prescott (1986).
2The idea that conﬁdentiality has value in its own right was suggested by Campbell (1979).
2intermediary ﬁnancing projects that he cannot screen. Furthermore, we also show
that limited diversiﬁcation can be beneﬁcial3. However our mechanism is very dif-
ferent and their paper focus on explaining the structure (debt ﬁnanced) and optimal
size of banks. In a non banking context, Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005) analyze
conditions for a conglomerate structure to lower the cost of ﬁnancing in the optimal
contracting framework of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
Secondly, this paper relates to the literature on information production in credit
markets. Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1986) analyze the interplay between the
reusability of information about borrowers and lenders’ incentives to engage in screen-
ing activities. The appropriability problem and related issues are considerer in the
context of credit-worthiness tests in Broecker (1990) and Gehrig (1998). The main
focuss of those paper is the eﬀect of increased competition on the equilibrium on
the credit market. Hauswald and Marquez (2002) study the strategic use of infor-
mation acquisition as a barrier to entry. The paper that is most related to ours is
Anand and Galetovic (2000). In a related framework, they show that the competitive
structure of the market endogenously adapts in response to the free-riding problem.
We analyze a distinct solution to the same problem. Another closely related paper
is Bernhardt and Krasa (2004). They show how the possibility of outside funding
aﬀects the contracting terms when an informed ﬁnancier has more information than
the entrepreneur. Their main focus is to explain venture capital ﬁnance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II the environment is laid
out and the social value of information is computed. The equilibria with individual
ﬁnance and diversiﬁed intermediation are solved in section III and section IV. Section
V provides some discussion. An appendix contains some proofs.
II. The environment
A. Agents and technology
We consider a two period economy populated by entrepreneurs (borrowers) and
investors. All agents are risk neutral and act to maximize Et=0 [c1 + c2]. The riskless
rate of interest is normalized to 0.
Borrowers. There are 2 cashless borrowers, labeled j = A,B. Each borrower
can be of either high (θ = H) or low (θ = L) type. The probability λ that a given
borrower is of type H is common knowledge. A borrower has access to two successive
projects, each one requiring an initial investment of It = 1. In a given period, we will
refer to the project owned by a type θ (θ = H,L) borrower as a type θ project. In the
ﬁrst period, a project succeeds with probability pθ in which case it generates a cash
ﬂow π1 > 1 or fails and yields 0. A type H project is better in the sense of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance: pH > pL. To simplify the algebra, it will be assumed that4
pL = 0. In the second period, the project of type L borrowers always fail, while those
of type H borrowers generate a cash ﬂow π2 ≡ 1+ω > 1 with certainty. For the ease
of exposition, we invoke the following restrictions on parameters, the interpretation
3See also Krasa and Villamil (1992) and Bond (2004) for results about less than perfect diversiﬁ-
cation.
4What matters for the analysis is that a (ﬁrst period) type L project be socially ineﬃcient. All
the results go through as soon as p
Lπ1 < 1.
3of which will be given momentarily:
λpHπ1 > 1, (A1)
λ
 
1 − pH 
(π2 − 1) < 1 − λ. (A2)
To focuss on the interplay between the production of information and the creation
of informational asymmetries, we assume that borrowers do not know their type5.
Lenders. There are two types of potential lenders. First, there is a large num-
ber of investors with enough endowment to ﬁnance one project per period (et = 1).
Secondly, there are two sophisticated lenders—or “specialists”—with the same en-
dowment but with the ability to screen one borrower at date 1. More precisely, say
because screening takes time, a sophisticated lender is unable to screen two projects
at the same time. To put it diﬀerently, screening exhibits decreasing return to scale.
Another interpretation of this speciﬁcation is that a specialist has the ability to eval-
uate only A or B, with private information about which of the two he is able to
evaluate. Instead, outsiders think he is able to screen A or B with equal probabil-
ities. This assumption captures the idea that there is some prior (but imperfect)
knowledge so as to each investors’ specialization.
Screening is costly for the specialist and yields a perfectly informative signal about
the borrower’s type. The type is then revealed to the specialist and to the borrower.
However, the act of screening is not publicly observable, and is therefore non con-
tractible. Most of the analysis will be conducted under the assumption that there
only one sophisticated lender, named S, with a screening cost c in utility. In section
IV.C, we shall consider the case of two specialists, with heterogenous screening costs,
c and C (c < C).
B. Value of information.
Throughout the paper, we use the expression “value of information” to refer to the
social value of screening. This value is computed by comparison with the allocation
of credit without screening.
If a borrower’s is unknown, the ﬁrst period project is funded, according to as-
sumption (A1). In period 2, reﬁnancing is contingent on the ﬁrst period outcome.
As all type L project fail, a success in period 1 signals that the borrower is of type
H, so that his second period project is funded. A borrower whose ﬁrst period project
failed is of type H with probability
λ′ ≡ Pr[H|failure] =
λ
 
1 − pH 
λ(1 − pH) + 1 − λ
. (1)
Now, (A2) can be rearranged to yield λ′π2 < 1 implying that the second period
project of such a borrower has negative NPV, and is not ﬁnanced.
Knowledge of the type allows to reject low type projects in period 1 and to avoid
rejecting high type projects in period 2. The social value of information is therefore
5Note that this is without loss of generality as borrowers have no collateral available and type L
projects allways fail. Assuming that type L borrowers get arbitrarily small payoﬀ from being ﬁnanced,
no menu of contracts allows to separate types. This distinguishes our approach from Bernhardt and
Krasa (2004).
4distributed over two periods of time and can be decomposed as the sum v1 + v2 of
ﬁrst period and second period value, with
v1 = 1 − λ, (2)
v2 = λ
 
1 − pH 
(π2 − 1). (3)
It will be assumed that screening is socially optimal but that the short term value of
information does not cover the screening cost c:
v1 + v2 > c > v1. (A3)
For the ease of exposition, it will be convenient to introduce the following notations
for the (gross) social surpluses for a screened and an unscreened project, respectively:
Ue = λ
 
pHπ1 − 1 + ω
 
, (4)
Une = λpH (π1 + ω) − 1. (5)
Naturally, one has Ue − Une = v1 + v2.
C. Limited commitment.
We assume that long term contracts between a lender and a borrower are not
feasible. Coupled with assumption (A3), this induces the problem of the appropri-
ability of the information produced by a specialist, because the short term value of
information, v1, is not suﬃcient to induce screening. While we take this restriction
as exogenous, it could be justiﬁed by the incentive eﬀects of short term contract and
the introduction of moral hazard considerations (see section V).
D. Timing of events.
At date 0, lenders compete for borrowers by oﬀering interest rate R for period 1.
When there is only one specialist with the ability to screen, this implies that S can
extract all the surplus from trade. Borrowers choose an investor to fund their ﬁrst
period project. Once lenders and borrowers matched, lenders perform their screening
and may reject negative NPV projects. First period investment are made.
Date 1. The payoﬀs of ﬁrst period projects are realized and publicly observed.
Payment R is made in the case of success. The (potentially) informed lender and
borrowers bargain according to a generalized Nash solution.
At date 2, payoﬀ of second period projects are realized and shared according to
the agreement reached at date 1.
The next sections solve for the equilibrium on the credit market under two distinct
cases: ﬁnancing by individual investors (section III) or by intermediaries with a diver-
siﬁed credit portfolio (section IV). As a general notation, let s be the mixed screening
strategy (s =probability of screening). As screening is not publicly observable, the
equilibrium in each case will comprise the market expectations. As contracts oﬀered
are public, the anticipated strategy can be a function of R. Denote by sa (R) this
anticipated strategy.
5III. Equilibrium with a focused specialist
This section solves for the equilibrium when the specialist does not raise addi-
tional funds and oﬀers to fund with his own endowment one borrower, say, A. This
provides a benchmark case, and will be useful in introducing the way we solve for the
equilibrium.
Note that unsophisticated lenders would require a payment R0 = 1
λpH to ﬁnance
a ﬁrst period project. As S can extract all the surplus from a borrower, it is then
obvious that R ≥ R0. Indeed, this is necessary for the specialist to create value:
Lemma 1. If R < R0 then S does not screen and does not provide ﬁnance.
Proof. The argument is by contradiction. If λpHR < 1 then it is not rational to fund
a project without knowing its type. Financing a project therefore perfectly reveals a
type H, driving to 0 the share of the long term proﬁt that the initial lender is able
to obtain. By (A3), s = 0, and no project is ﬁnanced.
We proceed in two steps. First, section A displays the informational rent that
the initial investor is able to extract in period 2, taking as given expectations sa (R).
Second, in section B we study the optimal screening strategy and characterize the
equilibrium.
A. Rent extraction in period 2
In the second period, the rent that the informed lender is able to extract on
positive NPV projects depends on his competitors’ information. Let ρ(p) denote this
rent, with p the probability assessed by outside investors that the borrower is of type
H. Formally p ≡ Pr[H|I], with I the public information at date t = 1.
To ﬁx ideas, we assume that the informed lender and the borrower bargain over the
rent associated with their bilateral relationship. We use a generalized Nash bargaining
solution. The borrower’s outside option is the surplus he gets if ﬁnanced by another
investor, while the lender’s outside option is simply 0 (riskless rate). The bilateral rent
is given by
 






p −1 when the borrower can get ﬁnanced outside
the relationship (at the rate 1
p) and π2 − 1 otherwise. The lender can seek ﬁnance
outside the relationship only if pπ2 > 1 or, equivalently if 1
p−1 < ω. Further assuming









As prescribed by intuition, the informational rent increases with the investor’s infor-






Figure 1 summarizes all events for a specialist matched with the borrower he
is able to screen. The investor cannot extract any proﬁt in period 2 on borrowers
whose ﬁrst project succeeded as this publicly signals a high type (thus p = 1 in that
6Alternatively, one could assume a ﬁrst price sealed auction between the informed specialist and
uniformed competitors, as in Rajan (1992) or von Thadden (2001). Our assumptions are such that
Rajan’s (1992) proposition 3 applies, yielding (6) as the expected gain of the informed lender.
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Figure 1: Second period gains for a specialist
with mixed strategy s. Dashed lines repre-
sent the information set of outside investors.
case, implying ρ(1) = 0). The rent that can be extracted on a high type borrower
who experienced a failure is a function of outsiders’ expectations as to the screening
strategy. For an anticipated strategy sa, we let p1 (sa) be the probability (of a type
H) assessed by an outside investor after observing that the borrower was ﬁnanced
and that the ﬁrst project failed. Using Bayes’ rule this can be computed as
p1 (sa) =
saλ(1 − pH)
saλ(1 − pH) + (1 − sa)(1 − λpH)
 1+
(1 − sa)(1 − λpH)
saλ(1 − pH) + (1 − sa)(1 − λpH)
 λ′.
Rearranging and using expression (1), p1 (sa) can be expressed using the prior prob-
ability corrected from ﬁrst period failure λ′:
p1 (sa) =
saλ′
saλ′ + 1 − sa   1 +
1 − sa
saλ′ + 1 − sa   λ′. (7)
One convenient way to look at Eq. (7) is as the weighted average of the information
possessed by an informed investor and by an uninformed one. To see this denote
by I ∈ {h,∅} the information possessed by an informed or uniformed specialist
respectively7. Then outsiders’s assessment of the type can be computed as
p1 (sa) = Pr[H|h]Pr[h|y,f] + Pr[H|∅,f]Pr[∅|y,f]. (8)
Now, the probability of the specialist having superior information about the project’s
type is (conditional on stage 1 ﬁnancing):
Pr[h|y,f] =
sa Pr[H|f]
sa Pr[H|f] + 1 − sa. (9)
Plugging (9) in (8) yields formula (7). Expression (7) features the leakage of the
specialist’s private information to outside investors. This is apparent from the fact
that p1 (sa) > λ′ as soon as sa > 0: observing the ﬁnancing of a borrower has
informational content. In the case of an anticipated pure strategy sa = 1, there is
complete revelation of the initial lender’s information, as p1 (1) = 1.
7With the obvious notation that I = h when the specialist knows the borrower to be of the H type
and I = ∅ when he does not have superior information. As no recognized L-project gets ﬁnanced,
the case I = l can be pruned.
7B. Equilibrium characterization
We ﬁrst solve for S’s screening strategy for given expectations sa (R). In a second
step, the equilibrium strategy and expectations are jointly determined.
Consider ﬁrst the expected gain of the specialist. As R ≥ R0, S rejects a borrower
when he knows he is of type L, and provide ﬁrst period ﬁnance otherwise. The





pHR − 1 +
 










where ρ1 (R) ≡ ρ ◦ p1 ◦ sa (R) denotes the rent extracted in the second period on a
type H borrower whose ﬁrst project failed. From the linearity of proﬁt (10) it follows
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We focuss on equilibria where agents’ expectations are correct. In equilibrium the
anticipated strategy must be correct, so that s∗ (R) = sa (R).
Using (11) it is easy to solve for the equilibrium. As a ﬁrst result, one can show
that the assumption that the net present value of information is positive but that
the short term value falls short of the initial cost implies that there must be some
screening in equilibrium (s∗ > 0) but that optimal screening cannot be attained
(s∗ < 1).
Proposition 1. There is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the candidate equilibrium s∗ = 1. Using (11), it must hold
that λ
 









= ρ(1) = 0, this is
equivalent to v1 > c which is ruled out by the right hand side of (A3). Consider next
the symmetric case s∗ = 0. By (11), it must hold that λ
 
1 − pH 
ρ(λ′)+(1 − λ) < c.
But (6) implies ρ(λ′) = ω so that λ
 
1 − pH 
ω + (1 − λ) < c, which is ruled out by
the left hand side of (A3).
The intuition for this result is as follows. If outside investors anticipate no screen-
ing, the credit granting decision is considered as uninformative. Then the specialist
would have an incentive to exert screening as his private information would not be
revealed to the market. Conversely, if outside investors anticipate perfect screening
then the credit decision would perfectly reveal the outcome of the specialist’s screen-
ing. Anticipating that outside investors would free ride on his screening activity, the
specialist would have no incentives to screen. As a consequence, there must be mixed
screening in equilibrium.
A mixed strategy 0 < sa < 1 can only be anticipated if investors are indiﬀerent
in equilibrium between screening and not screening:
λ
 
1 − pH 
ρ ◦ p1 ◦ sa (R) + (1 − λ) = c (12)












Figure 2: Equilibrium screening
(s∗ = sa)
rent must be such that the private value of information equates the screening cost.
(The reasoning is illustrated in ﬁgure 2).
One consequence of equation (12) is that in equilibrium expectations as to the
screening intensity sa (R) are not aﬀected by the ﬁrst period payment, R. Accordingly,





decreases with sa yields the following characterization of the equilibrium:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium is unique and is characterized by a payment R ≥ R0
and a mixed strategy 0 < s∗
1 < 1 such that
λ
 






+ (1 − λ) = c (13)
Proof. Obvious.
Deﬁne p∗ as the unique solution to
λ
 
1 − pH 
ρ(p∗) + 1 − λ = c (14)
This is the level of outsiders’ assessment of the quality of a specialist’s project for
which the rent is just suﬃcient to cover the screening cost. Using expression (6) and
equation (14), straightforward computations yield the following corollary of proposi-
tion 2 (proof in the appendix):
Corollary 3. The equilibrium level of screening for a specialist ﬁnancing one bor-





1 − λ′ (15)
The result in proposition 2 can be interpreted as follows. For information produc-
tion to take place in equilibrium, the specialist’ decision in period 1 must not be fully
revealing. In equilibrium, the noise introduced by mixed screening provides a partial
solution to the tradeof between the production and the revelation of information.
This may be related to Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) paradox, and to the solution
in Kyle (1985).
For the ease of exposition, we have assume that the lender, S, extracts all the
surplus from trade. As the equilibrium level of screening is independent of the spe-
cialist’ proﬁt, this simpliﬁcation is inconsequential for the analysis of the eﬃciency of
the credit market.
9IV. Equilibrium with a diversiﬁed intermediary
This section shows that the lender who perform the evaluation can retain more
of his informational advantage by forming a ﬁnancial intermediary. Speciﬁcally, we
show that by attracting simultaneously A and B, S can conceal his information, and
thereby have more incentives to screen at date 0. The formation of an intermediary
means that the specialist collects the endowment of some other investor and act as a
delegated screener.
Given that S cannot screen both borrowers, we consider that he screens A. De-
ﬁne s as the probability of screening, and sa the associated expectations by outside
investors.
A. Leakage of information
First, we will study the leakage of information and show that diversiﬁcation result
in more private information to be retained for a given level of market expectations.
Again, R ≥ R0 must hold in equilibrium, so that an unscreened project is ﬁnanced
in the ﬁrst period.
Now, depending on the result of S’s screening strategy, three cases might arise.
• with probability 1 − s, he does not have any information about A’s type, in
which case he ﬁnances both borrowers in the ﬁrst period.
• w.p. sλ, he learns that A is a type H borrower, and ﬁnances both borrowers.
• w.p. s(1 − λ), he learns that A is a type L. In that case, the screened borrower
is denied credit and only one borrower (that is, B) is ﬁnanced in the ﬁrst period.
As before, no rent is extracted on borrowers whose ﬁrst project succeeds. Note
that rejection of one borrower in the ﬁrst period then reveals that he is a low type
and that the specialist has no information as to the other’s type. We are left with
the cases where S funds both borrowers. Under the maintained assumption that ﬁrst
period proﬁts are observable the leakage of information—for a failed project—when
outside investors anticipate a screening strategy sa depends on whether one or two
project failed. Let p2
ff (sa) be the assessment on a failed project when both failed,
and p2
sf (sa) the assessment when the second project succeeded. Taking into account






















sλ′ + s + 2(1 − s)
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sλ′ + 2 − s
λ′. (19)
10S’s initial credit decision does reveal some information to the market as both prob-
abilities are greater than the unconditional probability, λ′. However for given market
expectations there is less leakage of information than in the case of the individual
investor. Indeed the comparison of (17), (19) and (7) shows that
p2
sf (sa) < p2
ff (sa) < p1 (sa) ∀s > 0. (20)
In particular, note that p2
ff (1) < 1, so that a specialist screening with probability
one retains private information as to the borrower’s type.
B. Equilibrium screening
We now compute the screening strategy, taking market beliefs, sa, as given. What




The screening intensity is chosen so as to maximize Π2 (s,R) − sc, where
Π2 (s,R) ≡ (1 − s)[2(λphR − 1)] + s(1 − λ)[λphR − 1]
+ sλ
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The expected gain for the specialist can be simpliﬁed as













The analysis of the equilibrium is analogous to that in section III with the exception of

















The same argument can be applied to show that there must be some evaluation in
equilibrium. However, there are now cases where the equilibrium screening strategy is
s∗ = 1 if the extracted rent is suﬃcient. Speciﬁcally, s∗ = 1 if the following condition
holds:













Using (17) and (19) the above condition can be rewritten as












We therefore have the following characterization.
Proposition 4. There exists a unique equilibrium with (i) s∗
2 = 1 if condition (23)
holds, and (ii) 0 < s∗
2 < 1 otherwise, with
λ
 
















+ (1 − λ) = c (24)






The intuition behind this result is as follows. The left hand side of (22) is the
maximum private value of screening for the specialist. Now, the specialist’s optimal





. By a reasoning similar to that of section B one has 0 < s∗
2 < 1 in so
far as condition (23) does not hold.
As diversiﬁcation entails less leakage of information, the equilibrium screening
strategy is characterized by more screening:
11Proposition 5. In equilibrium, it holds that s∗
2 (c) > s∗
1 (c).























1 and the monotonicity of p2
sf (.) and p2
































1) < p1 (s∗
1) from (20) and s∗
1 < 1. As ρ(.) is decreasing, (26)
cannot hold.
This result has a simple intuition. A larger portfolio allows the specialist to
commit to screen more because outside investors are unsure about which borrower is
being screened.
To conclude, we need to show that S can obtain additional funds from an unso-
phisticated investor to ﬁnance two projects. This easily follows from the fact that the
equilibrium payment is at least R0. Oﬀering a payment R0 if one ﬁrst period project
succeeds is (more than) suﬃcient to give the investor a non negative expected ﬁrst
period rate of return. Consequently, the problem between the intermediary and his
borrowers does not exist between the intermediary and his lender. There is no need
to ”monitor the monitor”.
C. When is intermediation best
Proposition (5) asserts that diversiﬁcation raises the incentives to screen when
the specialist is able to perform the evaluation of one of the borrowers he attracts.
However, this may be costly if the second borrower can be screened by another so-
phisticated investor.
To analyze this issue, we now consider that there are two heterogenous specialists:
S, with a screening cost c, and T, with a screening cost C > c. We maintain the
assumption that v1 < c < v1 + v2. We show that even if S does not screen one of
the borrowers—who could have been screened by T—it may be optimal to have S
ﬁnancing both borrowers.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which each specialist ﬁnances one borrower. From section
III we know that the specialists’ screening intensities depend on their respective costs.
The expected surplus is
 
s1 (c)(Ue − c) +
 






s1 (C)(Ue − C) +
 





whereas if S ﬁnances both borrowers the expected surplus is given by
 
s2 (c)(Ue − c) +
 





Comparing (27) and (28) yields the following condition for intermediation to be
best:
 
s2 (c) − s1 (c)
 
(v1 + v2 − c) > s1 (C)[v1 + v2 − C] (29)
12The left hand side of (29) is the gain in S’s screening intensity on the ﬁrst borrower
resulting from the dissimulation eﬀect of diversiﬁcation. The right hand side is the
loss associated with not screening the second borrower.
Proposition 6. Fix λ, pH, π1, π2, and c. Then there exists a (unique) threshold
C∗ > c such that intermediation is best for C > C∗, and specialized ﬁnance is best
for C∗ > C > c.
Proof. Follows from the monotonicity of the R.H.S. of (29) and the cases C = c and
C → v1 + v2.
Proposition shows that even if S is not the best screener for the second borrower,
the gain in screening one borrower may more than oﬀset the cost.
V. Discussion and extensions
A. Contractual restrictions
An important assumption for the analysis is that short term contracts between a
borrower and a lender are enforceable, but that long term contracts are not. We view
this as a stark way to capture the more general assumption that contractual possi-
bilities are not suﬃcient to solve the problem of the appropriability of information.
When this is the case, diversiﬁcation within an intermediary provides an additional
way to mitigate that problem.
The fact that long term debt contracts are not feasible may be rationalized by
the inalienability of human capital8. Somewhat relatedly, one can think of the en-
trepreneur’s projects as non contractible “ideas”. Alternatively, short term debt may
be preferred to long term debt because the threat of termination is used to strengthen
borrowers’ incentives say, to avoid moral hazard as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), or to
induce repayment when proﬁts are non veriﬁable as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
B. Informational content of ﬁnancing decisions
In this section, we discuss the timing of the ﬂow of information from the infor-
mation producer to the market, and we argue that it is consistent with the empirical
literature on the impact of credit announcement decision on a ﬁrm’s share price.
In our framework, the informational content of an initial credit granting is natu-
rally deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the probability of a borrower being of a high
type conditional on obtaining a credit and the unconditional probability. The former
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8Consider the following situation. The investor contracts with a ﬁrm, but the ﬁrm’s prospects
depend on the ability of some key employees. While long term contracts between the investor and
the ﬁrm are feasible, employees can leave the ﬁrm at the interim stage and set up their own business
or be hired by another ﬁrm in the same industry.
13The informational content of a loan renewal decision is analogously deﬁned as the
change in the market assessment of a type H induced by reﬁnancing. Obviously we
have for both cases
λ = Pr[H] < Pr[H|loan] < Pr[H|loan renewal] = 1, (32)
which asserts that in equilibrium the information produced by S is revealed progres-
sively to the market.
To be precise, eq. (32) implies that initial funding and refunding are both in-
formative. This pattern is consistent with the evidence of a positive impact of bank
loans agreement—as opposed to other types of loans— on a borrower’s equity price,
as ﬁrst documented on US data by James (1987). Lummer and McConnel (1989)
ﬁnd that only loan renewals have a statistically signiﬁcant impact. Further studies
have qualiﬁed this sharp contrast, showing that both new loans and renewed loans
are interpreted as good news by the stock market (see for instance Aintablian and
Gordon (2000) on Canadian data)9. Billet, Flannery and Garﬁnkel (1995) provide
evidence that the market reaction is positively related to the lender’s quality, as mea-
sured by Moody’s rating. The model is consistent with this ﬁnding, if we interpret
a “better” lender as one with a lower cost of screening, c. A decrease in c raises the
equilibrium level of screening, s∗
1 (.) or s∗
2 (.), and (from eq. (30) and (31)) the overall
informativeness of a funding decision.
We are by no means the ﬁrst to provide a theoretical model consistent with these
empirical ﬁnding (see for instance Diamond (1991)). However, the ﬁnding that loan
renewals convey information to outside investors is generally interpreted as evidence
that the initial lender obtains proprietary information over the course of the relation-
ship (Rajan 1992, Petersen and Rajan 1995). We show that this need not be the case.
Rather, in the model this is a consequence of the lender’s strategy to maintain his
information private.
C. Specialization and diversiﬁcation
To be completed.
VI. Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a model of a ﬁnancial intermediary as an institution de-
signed to protect informational rents. While the exact mechanism we have outlined is
of interest, the broader message of the paper is that information producers in credit
markets might ﬁnd it necessary to develop strategies to keep information private. We
believe that this insight could be used to analyze other ways to protect informational
rents. For instance, legal systems – via e.g. accounting standards – could be thought
of as legal protection of informational rents (as patent policy for innovation). This
could be used to explain the empirical link between the stringency of disclosure re-
quirements by ﬁrms and the orientation of the ﬁnancial system (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and
Levine 1996).
9For a comprehensive survey of that strand of literature, see James and Smith (2000).
14Another extension relates to the introduction of liquidity needs. In our model,
eﬃciency requires that the initial lender keeps his information private. This creates a
potential lemon problem that impinges on the liquidity of his assets (Akerlof 1970).
The resulting tradeoﬀ could be used for instance in the theory of last resort lending.
If informational rent extraction is necessary for the production of information, then
banks’ privileged access to central bank lending could be used to explain their ad-
vantage in granting credits. Likewise, this tradeoﬀ could be applied to the venture
capital industry to analyst the dynamic evolution from initial concern to maintain
some proprietary information to that of revealing ﬁrm’s quality in order to liquidate
one’s position.
A. Proof of corrolary 3.
We ﬁrst compute p∗ as the solution to equation (14). Using expression (6) and
proposition 1 one has
λ
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1 − pH 
c + λ − 1 + λ(1 − pH)
(33)
One need to ﬁnd s1 such that p1 (s1) = p∗.Using expression (7) and solving for s1yields
formula (15).
B. A few computations
This section provides some computations for p1 (.), p2
ff (.) and p2
sf (.). We drop
the superscript “a” to simplify. To obtain (16)-(17), we ﬁrst take into account the
probabilities of failure of each project for each state of S’s information—that is, (h,∅)
and (∅,∅)— to get
p2
ff (s) =
sλ(1 − pH)(1 − λpH)
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15Now, rearranging (7) one gets
p1 (s) = λ′ 1
sλ′ + 1 − s
= λ′ +
sλ′
sλ′ + 1 − s
 
1 − λ′ 
. (40)
It is straightforward to check that p1 (.), p2
ff (.) and p2
sf (.) are strictly increasing
functions. Direct inspection of (36) and (40) shows that p
ff
2 (s) < p1 (s) ∀s > 0.
Finally p2
sf (s) < p
ff
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